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21 
RECOVERING WAGNER V. INTERNATIONAL  
RAILWAY COMPANY 
Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White* 
INTRODUCTION 
Benjamin Cardozo’s 1921 opinion for the Court of Appeals                   
of New York in Wagner v. International Railway Co.1 has been               
called the “seminal case imposing liability on a tortfeasor for harm 
suffered by a person who came to the rescue of another.”2  The case                          
is indeed seminal, but it did not become so on its own.  Rather, in 
Wagner, Cardozo took a question on which there already was 
substantial precedent, and re-answered the question in a new, 
inimitable, and memorable way.  As Cardozo put it in a now-canonical 
phrase, “Danger invites rescue.”3   Then, precisely by virtue of the way 
Cardozo did this re-answering, Wagner became the leading decision 
on the subject.  
In this Article we analyze Cardozo’s accomplishment, and we 
show how his opinion in Wagner foreshadowed what he later 
accomplished in his even more celebrated opinion in Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R.R. Co.4  Part I extensively reviews the evidence and jury 
instructions at the trial in Wagner.  Part II outlines the relevant New 
York case law at the time of the appeal.  Part III identifies the ways in 
which counsel employed and characterized this case law and its 
application to the Wagner case on appeal.  Finally, Part IV analyzes 
Cardozo’s opinion in Wagner, explaining how he approached the 
 
*Each of the authors is David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University 
of Virginia School of Law. 
1 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921). 
2 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD), TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM cmt. a (Am. 
Law Inst. 2010).  
3 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437. 
4 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
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rescue issue, how he applied this approach to the facts, and why we 
believe that Wagner was a precursor to Palsgraf. 
I.  THE FACTS AND THE TRIAL 
Arthur Wagner sued the International Railway Company, 
which operated trolley cars, for negligence.5  At trial, there was a jury 
verdict for the defendant.6 Wagner appealed, and the Appellate 
Division affirmed.7  Wagner then appealed to the Court of Appeals, 
where Cardozo sat. The case, which produced Cardozo’s “danger 
invites rescue” proposition, arose out of a bizarre set of facts which 
Cardozo’s opinion severely truncated.  Here is Cardozo’s statement of 
the facts in Wagner:  
The action is for personal injury. The defendant 
operates an electric railway between Buffalo and 
Niagara Falls. There is a point on its line where an 
overhead crossing carries its tracks above those of the 
New York Central and the Erie. A gradual incline 
upwards over a trestle raises the tracks to a height of 
twenty-five feet. A turn is then made to the left at an 
angle of from sixty-four to eighty-four degrees. After 
making this turn, the line passes over a bridge, which is 
about one hundred and fifty-eight feet long from one 
abutment to the other. Then comes a turn to the right at 
about the same angle down the same kind of an incline 
to grade. Above the trestles, the tracks are laid on ties, 
unguarded at the ends. There is thus an overhang of the 
cars, which is accentuated at curves. On the bridge, a 
narrow footpath runs between the tracks, and beyond 
the line of overhang there are tie rods and a protecting 
rail. 
  
Plaintiff [Arthur Wagner] and his cousin Herbert 
[Wagner] boarded a car at a station near the bottom of 
one of the trestles. Other passengers, entering at the 
same time, filled the platform, and blocked admission 
to the aisle.  The platform was provided with doors, but 
 
5 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437-38. 
6 Id. at 437.  
7 Id. at 438.   
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the conductor did not close them. Moving at from six to 
eight miles an hour, the car, without slackening, turned 
the curve. There was a violent lurch, and Herbert 
Wagner was thrown out, near the point where the trestle 
changes to a bridge. The cry was raised, “Man 
overboard.”  The car went along the bridge, and stopped 
near the foot of the incline. Night and darkness had 
come on. Plaintiff walked along the trestle, a distance 
of four hundred and forty-five feet, until he arrived at 
the bridge, where he thought to find his cousin’s body. 
Several other persons, instead of ascending the trestle, 
went beneath it, and discovered under the bridge the 
body they were seeking. As they stood there, the 
plaintiff’s body struck the ground beneath them. 
Reaching the bridge, he had found upon a beam his 
cousin’s hat, but nothing else. About him, there was 
darkness. He missed his footing, and fell.8 
Scholars have shown that in both his MacPherson and Palsgraf 
opinions, Cardozo’s treatment of the facts was artful to the point of 
possibly being disingenuous.9  In contrast, the above statement of the 
facts in Wagner contains only one detail that is not fully supported by 
the trial record: that there was a “violent lurch” when the electric car 
turned the curve as it ascended toward the bridge.10  Of all the 
witnesses who were present when Herbert Wagner fell off the car as it 
went around a curve, only one, Herbert himself, testified that just 
before he fell off, the car “lurched” and “somebody on the platform 
lurched with the car, and knocked up against me and swung me around 
and I lost my foothold [and fell].”11  When the Wagner case was 
argued before the Court of Appeals, counsel for Wagner, Hamilton 
Ward (later to be the New York Attorney General under Governor 
Franklin D. Roosevelt), maintained in his statement of the facts that  
[w]hen the car reached the curve to the left on top of the 
bridge it turned at such a rapid rate of speed as to cause 
 
8 Id. at 437. 
9 See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., TORTS STORIES 41-44, 51 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. 
Sugarman eds., 2003); WILLIAM H. MANZ, THE PALSGRAF CASE: COURTS, LAW, AND SOCIETY 
IN 1920S NEW YORK ix-xi (2005).  
10 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437. 
11 Record on Appeal at 46, Wagner v. International Railway Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921) 
[hereinafter “Record on Appeal”].  
3
Abraham and White: Recovering Wagner
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
24 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
the crowd to lurch toward plaintiff and his cousin, 
Herbert J. Wagner, throwing the latter off of the car. . . . 
The violence of the lurch was caused by the excessive 
speed of the car in making the turn.12   
No other witness referred to a “lurch;” some, including Arthur Wagner 
himself, describing the car as “swaying” as it went around curves and 
the passengers as “swaying” with it.13 
A characterization of the car’s having “violent[ly] lurch[ed]” 
was arguably helpful to Cardozo’s framing of the Wagner case, 
because it provided evidence that the car may have been driven at too 
rapid a rate of speed around a curve, especially since it was crowded, 
its back doors were open, and some passengers, unable to find seats 
inside, were hanging onto rails on its back platform’s steps.  All of 
those factors helped Cardozo reach a conclusion that the railroad may 
have been negligent toward Herbert Wagner, which was a necessary 
step in his conclusion that it may have been negligent toward Herbert’s 
rescuer, Arthur, as well.14  
But, for the most part, Cardozo’s bare-bones summary of the 
facts in Wagner was accurate.  But because the summary was bare-
bones, it has had the effect of depriving audiences of much of the 
human interest, and much of the evidence of Cardozo’s creativity, in 
the case.  There was no opinion delivered by the trial judge in Wagner, 
and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York issued 
a one-paragraph opinion upholding the jury’s defense verdict in the 
case.15  To flesh out the scenario that resulted in Arthur Wagner’s being 
permanently disabled from his fall from the International Railway’s 
bridge, we must turn to the trial record, and to the briefs submitted to 
the Court of Appeals after Hamilton Ward appealed to that court.  
Arthur Wagner was 30 years old, and his cousin, Herbert, was 
24, when on August 20, 1916, the two men, who lived across from one 
another on Maple Street in Buffalo, New York, embarked on a pleasure 
outing to Grand Island on Lake Erie, just south of Niagara Falls and 
 
12 Brief of Appellant at 4, Wagner v. International Railway Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921) 
[hereinafter “Brief of Appellant”]. 
13 Arthur Wagner testified that “the crowd kind of swayed and . . . I turned around and just 
saw the shadow of man go overboard.”  Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 105-06. Another 
witness for the plaintiff said that as the car went around a curve “there was a little jar you could 
notice,” which counsel for the plaintiff got the witness to rephrase as a “little swaying.” Record 
on Appeal, supra note 11, at 79.  
14 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 438. 
15 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 291-92. 
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about ten miles north of Buffalo.16  Arthur was employed as an 
upholsterer, and Herbert was a bricklayer; both men were single.17  
They left Buffalo around 2:30 in the afternoon of August 20, which 
was a Sunday, traveling on an electric railway car – a trolley – operated 
by the International Railway Company.18  Single “500”-type cars, 
approximately forty feet long and painted yellow, were used by the 
company on its Buffalo-Niagara Falls route, which included several 
stops and was typically busy with local and tourist passengers.19  
Passenger service on the route appears to have been very frequent on 
Sundays in August, because when Herbert and Arthur attempted to 
board a car on their return trip, sometime after 8 P.M., at least one car 
passed by their station without stopping since it was full.20  
The electric railway route north from Buffalo to Grand Island 
had taken them through the towns of Tonawanda and North 
Tonawanda. The car had stopped at Payne’s Junction in North 
Tonawanda and then proceeded up the trestle, over the bridge, and 
down to the Edgewater stop, where the Wagners got off.  At the stop 
there was a hotel, Fitch’s saloon, and a boat landing where a ferry took 
passengers to Grand Island. The Wagners arrived on Grand Island 
between 5 and 5:30 P.M.  There was a saloon on the island itself, and 
Arthur and Herbert had drinks there, Herbert having a bottle and a half 
of beer and Arthur two bottles.21  On the island, the Wagners watched 
a ball game, walked around, and sat on the dock.  They met a group of 
people they knew, composed of both men and women, and remained 
there until sometime between 7 and 7:30 P.M., when they took a ferry 
back to the Edgewater railway stop on the mainland.22  While waiting 
for the International Railway car, they again had drinks, Herbert 
Wagner having “two drinks of beer” and Arthur “two drinks of Alden 
water.”23 
 
16 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 98, 100-01. 
17 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 99. 
18 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 101. 
19 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 49. 
20 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 102.  Another witness, George William Reppentine, 
who was also a passenger on the return trip, said that “I was there at Edgewater waiting for 
the car about twenty minutes. There was two cars passed us, and we couldn’t get onto them 
on account of the crowd.” Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 55.  
21 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 53.  
22 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 52. 
23 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 53.  
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By the time they returned to the Edgewater railway station, the 
sun had gone down and they found a number of people waiting for a 
southbound trolley car toward Buffalo.  When one arrived, the car 
stopped before the place where they were waiting in the station, and 
they went past the front of the car to the back to get on the rear 
platform.24  The people waiting had consisted of both men and women, 
and all the women were ushered into the interior of the car.  There were 
doors closing off the platform from the outside, but they were left open, 
and several men -- Herbert Wagner speculated as many as ten -- chose 
to stand on the platform, smoking. Herbert had noticed that “the car 
wasn’t crowded . . . when we walked past it to get on [the train] . . . 
you could see the whole aisle of the car was empty.  When we got up 
to the car, the ladies all went inside and maybe one or two fellows had 
gone in.”25 
   When the Wagners eventually reached the steps of the car 
leading toward the rear platform, they found that they were the last 
people boarding the car.  There were a sufficient number of men on the 
rear platform to initially prevent them from entering the interior of the 
car, so they first stood on the steps, eventually climbing up to the 
platform, where they stood near one another on the back edge of the 
platform, each holding on to a rail.  “We tried to get up further [on to 
the platform],” Arthur Wagner testified, but “[t]here were too many 
people there.”26  At that point, with the Wagners both poised between 
the edge of the platform and its steps, the conductor of the car gave a 
signal to its motorman to start.  The conductor testified that he had not 
observed the position of the Wagners when he gave the signal, but 
subsequently noticed that “there was someone on the step,” and 
testified: 
I got a couple of people to step off the back platform 
into the body of the car, and then I looked out and then 
when I see those men on the step I asked them to get up 
off the step so they wouldn’t get hit going around the 
curve up on top of the trestle.27   
 
24 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 103-04. 
25 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 44-45. 
26 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 105.  
27 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 218-19. One witness for the defendant stated that he 
had heard the conductor ask men on the steps of the platform to “come inside,” apparently 
meaning into the interior of the car. Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 138. Arthur Wagner 
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Almost immediately after leaving the Edgewater stop, the car 
line entered the trestle and moved upward at a rise of about six percent, 
eventually reaching a bridge about twenty-five feet above the tracks of 
the Erie Railroad.  Before reaching the bridge, the track turned left on 
a curve, at an angle of sixty-four to eighty-four degrees.28  According 
to the testimony of several passengers, the car’s passing around the 
curve caused it to “sway,” and some passengers who were standing 
“swayed” along with it.29  Herbert Wagner, about to join the Army, 
was deposed before trial, and his deposition testimony was read into 
evidence at the trial.  He testified as follows about the moments just 
before the car reached the bridge:  
Q. When you got upon the platform, the car was going?  
 
A. Half way up the trestle. 
 
Q. And then what happened?  
 
A. The car turned . . . , I stood at the left of my cousin, 
was at the back end of the car, and he was at my                      
right . . . and the car turned, and I was holding on the 
car with . . . my left arm, and as the car turned, it                       
swung; . . . and I went to reach with [my left] arm to 
grab ahold of something to steady myself, and as I did 
that, somebody on the platform lurched with the car, 
and knocked up against me and swung me around and 
I lost my foothold and dislocated my shoulder and I 
went down under the trestle.30 
Arthur Wagner was not initially aware that his cousin had 
fallen from the trolley car.  As he put it:  
The car started going up the grade, and when it got to 
the barn the crowd kind of swayed and [I] heard 
somebody . . . holler as though somebody wanted help, 
and I . . . turned around and just saw the shadow of a 
 
subsequently testified that the conductor had said nothing to him. Record on Appeal, supra 
note 11, at 255.  
28 This testimony was by an assistant engineer in the City of Buffalo’s Engineer’s Office. 
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 17-18. 
29 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 40-41, 77-79.  
30 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 45-46. 
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man go overboard. . . . Then I looked right around to 
see who it was, to see where [Herbert] was, and I saw 
he was gone.31   
Herbert Wagner had apparently fallen directly off the trestle to the 
ground below, a distance of at least 15 feet.  The rear of the trolley car 
extended beyond the car’s track as the car went around the curve and 
there was no barrier beyond the tracks.  Therefore, there was nothing 
to prevent Herbert’s falling into space.32  His body landed on or near 
the Erie tracks directly under the trestle, where he was subsequently 
found, unconscious from the impact of the fall.33  
After realizing that Herbert had fallen off the car, Arthur yelled, 
along with another passenger, “Man Overboard,”34 and when the 
conductor heard them he rang a bell, a signal for the motorman of the 
car to stop at a “regular stopping place” on the track, near a car barn at 
the south end of the trestle.35  After hearing the bell the motorman 
slowed the car, which proceeded approximately 550 feet across the 
bridge and down an incline, where it stopped at the foot of the trestle.  
At that point the conductor came around to the front of the car and told 
the motorman that a man had fallen from the car.  The motorman then 
“fixed [his] car so it was safe to leave and took [his] lantern and went 
[to the] back [end of the car].”36     
At this point the testimony of central figures in the incident 
began to diverge.  Arthur Wagner testified:  
[after] the car slowed down and stopped . . . , I looked 
for the conductor and . . . the conductor . . . says, ‘Show 
me where he fell,’ and I stepped off the car, I walked up 
along the bridge, and the conductor with two or three 
other men followed me with a lantern about two or three 
feet behind me.37 
The conductor, Leo Beemer, testified, however, that after he 
heard the cry of man overboard, “I gave the motorman a bell,” 
instructing him to “stop at the regular stopping place at the bottom of 
 
31 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 105-06.  
32 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 28-29.  
33 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 91, 174.  
34 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 107. 
35 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 219. 
36 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 177. 
37 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 107. 
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the trestle.”38  Beemer then, he said, “went around [to the front of the 
car] and told the motorman that someone had fallen off the car on the 
trestle,” and then “left him and . . . went back into the car barns                               
to get a lantern from the watchman there.”39   Once he had the lantern, 
Beemer said, “I saw this other car coming over the top of the trestle,” 
and “when I [saw] him coming . . . I took the lantern and flagged him 
. . . on account of our car standing at the bottom of the incline . . . so 
that I would take no chance of him running into the back of our car.”40  
After telling the motorman of the second car that a man had fallen off 
the trestle, and that the first car had stopped so that a search for him 
could be conducted, Beemer said that he “started down the side of the 
dirt down between the street car barns and the trestle.”41  Asked 
whether anyone went with him, Beemer replied, “I was alone as far as 
I can remember.”42  Beemer made no mention of meeting Arthur 
Wagner, or having any conversation with him.  
In contrast, Wagner testified that he and Beemer had walked 
“straight back” from the back of the car, on railroad ties, and that 
Beemer had a lantern.  “We went up to the top of the trestle,” Wagner 
said, and “we found somebody that said ‘Here is his hat,’ and picked 
it up and then showed it to me and I identified it.”43  Wagner then 
recalled that he “started to walk forward again,” and testified: 
I suddenly discovered I was in the dark, . . . and then I 
turned around and I saw no light, . . . and waited then, 
perhaps thought I could see a light somewhere, and                          
I waited another minute . . . until I saw a light way                     
down below underneath . . . down below the trestle 
somewheres in front of me.44   
At that point, Wagner continued, “I hollered, and I took a few steps to 
go down [back to the car]. . . . I took a few steps and I fell through,” 
landing “on the ground below the trestle.”  He dropped his cousin’s hat 
as he fell, and had not seen it since.45 
 
38 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 219.  
39 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 220.  
40 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 222.  
41 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 222-23.  
42 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 223.  
43 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 108.   
44 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 108-09.  
45 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 109-10.  
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Beemer, however, said that when he arrived beneath the trestle, 
“I walked right on up as far as I could” to find “the motorman . . . with 
his lantern.”46  He had just found the motorman, he recalled, when 
“some little girl said ‘Here’s the man,’ and I walked over to where he 
was then and the motorman was there too.”47  Beemer then “went back 
to telephone the doctor, or the ambulance, at Payne’s Avenue 
[Junction].”48   
Asked “when you got off the car there at the rear end, did you 
say to anybody, ‘Show me where he fell,’?” Beemer said “No, I 
didn’t.”  Asked “Did you at any time ask anybody to go up on the 
trestle?”  Beemer said, “No, I didn’t.”  Asked “Did you yourself go up 
on the trestle?”  Beemer said “No, I didn’t go up on the trestle.”49  He 
added that he had not flagged the second car down until it had passed 
over the bridge and was on its way down an incline.50   Finally, Beemer 
stated that the second car had come over the bridge before “the second 
man,” Arthur Wagner, fell from it.  Asked whether “there was [any] 
room for that second man to have stayed on [the] track [running over 
the bridge] when a car passed over it,” Beemer replied, “No, there was 
no room for him to stay there.”51  Thus, Beemer was “willing to swear 
that [the second] car passed over the bridge before [the] man fell 
down.”52 
 No other witnesses testified about the actions of Arthur 
Wagner in walking up the trestle onto the bridge in search of his 
cousin.  One witness appeared to corroborate Beemer’s having come 
out of the car barn with a lantern, having walked in the direction of the 
trestle, where a second car was approaching, and having “flag[ged] the 
other trolley coming.”53  After doing so, the witness testified that 
Beemer “proceeded on and under the trestle,” where the witness lost 
sight of him.54   Earl Roy, the motorman of the car from which Herbert 
Wagner had fallen, corroborated that Beemer had arrived underneath 
the trestle shortly after Roy and others had found Herbert Wagner’s 
body, and that Beemer had then gone to the car barn to use the 
 
46 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 223.  
47 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 223.   
48 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 223-24.  
49 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 224-25.  
50 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 225.  
51 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 226.  
52 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 226-27.  
53 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 210, 212. 
54 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 213.  
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telephone.55  Since  Beemer–and the motorman Roy as well–56 denied 
having ever said “Show me where he fell” to anyone, there was no 
apparent explanation for why Arthur Wagner would have gone up the 
trestle onto the bridge in search of his cousin, rather than underneath 
the trestle with the others involved in the search.  Edward Franchot, 
representing the International Railway Company, noted on more than 
one occasion, as the case passed from the trial court to the Appellate 
Division and then to the Court of Appeals, that Arthur Wagner had 
been drinking before boarding the trolley car at the Edgewater stop, 
and speculated that perhaps Arthur had gone up the trestle because his 
judgment was impaired from being intoxicated.57 
The credibility of Beemer’s and Arthur Wagner’s accounts 
would end up being crucial to the outcome of the trial.  It was the 
central issue posed by Judge Charles B. Wheeler’s instruction to the 
jury, subsequently to be discussed.  But there was additional evidence 
presented at the trial about Leo Beemer’s actions, from witnesses who 
claimed that, in the period between the accident and the trial, Beemer 
himself had given a different account of what he did at the 
commencement of the search.  Since the jury, in accepting Beemer’s 
testimony rather than Arthur Wagner’s, must have disregarded this 
evidence regarding Beemer’s prior inconsistent account, it seems 
worthwhile to review it in some detail.  
Beemer was no longer a conductor for the International 
Railway Company at the time of the trial, which took place in April 
and May, 1918 (the accident had occurred in August, 1916).  He was 
working for the Beaver Board Company in Buffalo, and had been 
doing so for five months.58  While employed at the Beaver Board 
Company he was interviewed on March 22, 1918, by a Mr. Flynn, a 
partner of Wagner’s counsel Hamilton Ward. Also present at the 
interview was Carl J. Sturgis, the secretary to W.F. MacGlashan, the 
president of the company.  In Ward’s cross-examination of Beemer in 
the Wagner trial, the following colloquy took place: 
Q. Mr. Flynn, my partner, came out and called on you 
at your place of employment, didn’t he? 
 
55 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 180. 
56 Roy was asked “after you got off the car and were on the ground, did you say to any man, 
‘Where? You show me where he fell?’ and answered “No.” Record on Appeal, supra note 11, 
at 181.  
57 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 53-54.  
58 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 216.  
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A. Yes, sir. 
 
Q. Where did you have that conversation? 
 
A. In the office. 
 
Q. Do you know Mr. Sturgis, the Secretary to the 
President? 
 
A. I don’t know him. 
 
Q. Was he there when you had your talk with Mr. 
Flynn? 
 
A. I couldn’t say whether he was or not. 
 
Q. Did you say to Mr. Flynn . . . that you asked the 
brother of the man who fell to come along with you? 
Did you tell Mr. Flynn that in Mr. Sturgis’s presence? 
 
A. No, I didn’t. 
 
Q. And did you tell them that when you and the brother 
got up on the trestle you couldn’t see anybody around, 
and you started to go back, and the brother of the man 
who fell through the trestle said he was going back 
again? Did you tell Mr. Flynn and Mr. Sturgis that? 
 
A. No, I didn’t tell them that. 
 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Flynn and Mr. Sturgis on the 22nd 
of March, at the place of your employment, that you 
went up on the trestle with the man that you thought 
was the brother of the injured person, and that you 
didn’t see anything and came back? 
 
A. No, I didn’t tell him that at all. 
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Q. Did you mention anything about this man going with 
you to Mr. Flynn or Mr. Sturgis? 
 
A. The gentleman I was talking with, I don’t know what 
his name was, I told him I went up to the trestle there 
when I flagged this other car coming down. 
 
Q. Did you tell him anything about going up with this 
man that you thought was the brother of the injured 
man? 
 
A. I just don’t remember what I told him.59 
After this exchange and the conclusion of Beemer’s testimony, 
Ward called Carl Sturgis as a witness (apparently in rebuttal), and the 
following exchange took place: 
Q. Were you there on the 22nd day of March, last, when 
Mr. Flynn, my partner, came out there to interview this 
conductor? 
 
A. I was. 
 
Q. And were you present at the conversation between 
Mr. Flynn and Mr. Beemer?                                    
 
A. I was. 
 
Q. Did Mr. Beemer say to Mr. Flynn this or this in 
substance: That after the car stopped he asked some 
man there to come along with him, and that they went 
upon the trestle? 
 
A. Yes, he made the suggestion and they went back on 
the trestle. 
 
Q. And did he say this to Mr. Flynn, or this in substance: 
That when he and the man got back on the trestle they 
 
59 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 227-29. 
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looked around and could not see anybody and he started 
to go back? 
 
A. Yes.60 
Sturgis was then cross-examined by Edward Franchot, who 
unsuccessfully attempted to demonstrate that Sturgis had been coached 
by Flynn or Ward about the substance of Flynn’s interview with Ward 
before his testimony, and that he may have seen a memorandum from 
Flynn to Ward summarizing the conversation Flynn had had with 
Beemer.61  Franchot was able to elicit two concessions from Sturgis, 
however, that could have called the credibility of Sturgis’s testimony 
into question.  Sturgis admitted that after witnessing Flynn’s interview 
with Beemer, Sturgis expected to be called as a witness; and Sturgis 
acknowledged that, although he was a stenographer, he had taken no 
notes of the interview of Beemer.62 
Nonetheless, on its face, the direct testimony of Sturgis could 
have supported an inference that either Beemer’s memory was faulty 
or that the parts of his trial testimony that conflicted with Arthur 
Wagner’s account were false.  Sturgis was an employee of the same 
company that employed Beemer, had never met Flynn before the 
interview, and had only appeared in court because Hamilton Ward’s 
firm had subpoenaed him as a witness.63  Yet in his testimony, Sturgis 
promptly agreed that Beemer had told Flynn, in substance, that he had 
asked “some man” to go upon the trestle with him in search of Herbert 
Wagner, and that when Beemer had not found anyone, Beemer had 
“gone back” toward the car from which Herbert Wagner had fallen.64 
Beemer had already testified, in recounting his activities after 
he rang the bell for the motorman to stop the car, that immediately after 
telling the motorman that someone had fallen off, he had gone in search 
of a lantern.  Robert Hogg, after noting that he had seen Beemer with 
a lantern signaling the car, had also stated, on cross-examination, that 
it might have been as many as five minutes between the time he first 
saw Beemer with a lantern and the time the car stopped.  So Beemer 
might have had time to meet Arthur Wagner, ask him to show him 
 
60 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 245-47. 
61 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 247, 251-52.  
62 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 248-49.   
63 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 248. 
64 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 246.  
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where the man might have fallen, started along with Wagner up the 
trestle to the bridge, shining his lantern, and when seeing nothing, 
abruptly turned around, depriving Wagner of light. 
More than one witness who was present when Herbert and 
Arthur Wagner’s bodies were found lying under the trestle stated that 
it was a very short interval of time between the discovery of Herbert’s 
body and the subsequent discovery of Arthur’s.65  But one witness 
speculated that it may have taken as many as fifteen minutes for the 
search party, once having located Herbert’s body, to have gotten back 
from that spot to the car.66  Another witness, speaking of the journey 
from the car to where Herbert was found, said “there was some 
difficulty getting there. . . . [T]here is underbrush and burdocks, . . . 
and a good many things in the dark, a man has to go slow.”67  It was 
apparent that by the time both bodies were located, the second car had 
descended the trestle and was stopped behind the first car, because 
once both men were found, Herbert was carried to the second car and 
Arthur to the first.68  So Beemer, after concluding that a search on the 
bridge would be futile, could have then headed back toward the car, 
noticed the arrival of a second car, and stopped to signal that car in an 
interval when Arthur was on the bridge without any light.  
Two other features of Beemer’s testimony about his 
conversation with Flynn and Sturgis could have undermined his 
credibility generally.  One is that he said “I don’t know” Sturgis, and 
he couldn’t say whether Sturgis was “there or not” when he talked to 
Flynn.  Given that Sturgis was the general secretary of the president of 
a company for which Beemer had worked for five months, and that 
Beemer surely recognized the significance of an interview with a 
lawyer about a case in which he was going to be called as a witness, 
both statements seem evasive.  The other is that on cross-examination, 
Ward established that two or three weeks after his interview with 
Sturgis, Beemer met with Edward Franchot and an associate, who paid 
him for his time in the interview, and that Franchot had showed him a 
statement that Beemer had made “right after the accident.”  Ward and 
Beemer then had the following exchange: 
 
65 George W. Rappentine, who was one of the searchers who initially found Herbert’s body, 
stated that it was “a minute or two” after he discovered the body that “somebody said, ‘Here 
is another one.’” Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 70.  
66 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 94. 
67 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 172.  
68 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 73. 
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Q. And then did you make up your mind that perhaps 
you had been mistaken in what you said to Mr. Flynn 
and Mr. Sturgis? 
 
A. No, I didn’t. 
 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Franchot and [his associate] what 
you had said to Mr. Flynn and Mr. Sturgis? 
 
A. I did. 
 
Q. You didn’t tell them anything about your going up 
on the trestle, did you? 
 
A. Why, no, I didn’t tell them I went up on it because I 
didn’t go up there. 
 
Q. You didn’t. Did you tell them that you were asked 
this question? 
 
A. I forget whether I did or not.69 
In light of all the other issues raised by the events that produced 
Wagner v. International Railway—whether the car was going at an 
excessive rate of speed around the curve just before Herbert was 
thrown off; whether the doors shutting off the back end of the car from 
the outside should have been closed; whether the car should not have 
started up an incline when passengers were still standing on its back 
platform, some of them partly on its outside steps; whether the 
conductor had taken sufficient steps to move the passengers standing 
on the platform into the interior of the car, where there apparently was 
room—why was so much attention paid to what Arthur Wagner and 
Leo Beemer had done, or not done, after Herbert was thrown off the 
train?  That answer is that Edward Franchot had sensed that if he could 
persuade the trial judge that the sole basis of the International 
Railway’s negligence toward Arthur had to be found in the conduct of 
Beemer after Herbert had fallen off the train and a search for him had 
begun, anything that had happened before that, whether it was 
 
69 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 231.  
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evidence of the line’s negligence toward Herbert or not, was irrelevant 
to Arthur’s case.  Franchot’s strategy was to focus on Arthur’s conduct 
after his cousin disappeared, in order to show that no trolley car 
employee had been negligent toward him and that he had arguably 
been contributorily negligent, a complete bar to plaintiffs in negligence 
suits in New York at the time.  Having shown that, Franchot would 
then rely on what was in effect a “proximate cause” argument: that 
even if the International Railway had been negligent toward Herbert, 
this was not negligence to Arthur; proof of separate acts of negligence 
were needed. 
After both parties rested and the jury was excused, both Ward 
and Franchot made several motions to Judge Wheeler in connection 
with his forthcoming instruction to the jury.70  Wheeler subsequently 
gave an instruction to the jury that completely accepted Franchot’s 
arguments in those motions, with the result that the irreconcilability of 
Arthur Wagner’s and Beemer’s testimony became the central focus of 
the jury’s deliberations. Wheeler instructed the jury as follows:  
In light of the view of the case which the court takes of 
each of the facts and of the law I charge you that if there 
was any negligence on the part of the [International] 
Railway Company in overcrowding the car without 
providing the passengers with seats, or if there was 
negligence in the operation of the car around these 
curves which caused injury to the cousin of the plaintiff, 
. . . in as much as the car afterward crossed the trestle 
and reached a place of safety and without injuring                    
the plaintiff in this action in any way, that . . . if such 
negligence existed on the part of the company, such 
negligence is not available to the plaintiff in this action 
as the basis of any recovery; that he must base his right 
to recover upon what transpired after the car in question 
had crossed the trestle and reached the ground. . . . 71 
 
Now, then, I charge you if without any invitation or any 
request on the part of the defendant’s conductor . . . if 
the plaintiff went upon this trestle, that is and of itself 
more or less dangerous under the conditions of darkness 
 
70 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 255-73.  
71 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 275. 
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. . . if he, of his own motion and at his own suggestion 
. . . went there, and . . . fell from the trestle, then                   
there can be no recovery in this action. . . . If, on the 
other hand, he went up there at the request of the 
conductor of the car . . . the conductor was . . . bound to 
exercise reasonable care under those circumstances for 
the safety of the man who went up there. . . . I am going 
to leave it to you to determine, first, whether as a matter 
of fact he went there at the request of the conductor, 
and, second, if he did . . . whether the conductor in fact 
left him in the darkness, without warning of [the 
conductor’s] going, and whether such acts constituted 
negligence on the part of the conductor, whose 
negligence would be imputed to the railroad company 
itself. You will remember, though, that the conductor 
denies that he asked [the plaintiff] to point out                         
where the accident happened. . . . These things present 
questions of fact for you to determine in the first 
instance whether was matter of fact the plaintiff’s 
version is correct or the defendant’s version is                  
correct. . . . If [the plaintiff] did not . . . [go]on top of 
this trestle to point out the place of the accident at the 
request of the conductor . . . there can be no recovery in 
this action.72   
Wheeler’s instruction precluded Arthur Wagner from recovering from 
the railroad by virtue of its negligence to Herbert Wagner.  In 
Wheeler’s view, although he did not express it in the language of 
proximate causation, once the car from which Herbert had fallen 
“reached a place of a safety without injuring [Arthur] in any way,” a 
chain of events, the events that began with the successive actions of 
the railway in creating a risk that Herbert might fall from the car, had 
become complete.73  A new chain had begun, if at all, in Wheeler’s 
view, only when Beemer allegedly invited Arthur to accompany him 
on a potentially dangerous search for his cousin.  The railroad’s 
negligence did not cause that search in itself, Wheeler believed, and 
therefore the railroad could not be liable to Arthur Wagner unless it 
had been negligent after the trolley car had stopped.  That is, the 
 
72 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 276-77. 
73 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 275.  
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railroad could be liable to Arthur only if Beemer, after providing 
Arthur with light in a dangerous place in the darkness, had suddenly, 
without warning, abandoned their joint search and deprived Arthur of 
light.  
Edward Franchot had outmaneuvered Hamilton Ward.  
Franchot had produced several witnesses who testified that after 
Herbert fell off the car, all the persons involved in the search for him, 
save Arthur, had gone under the trestle, rather than back up it toward 
the bridge, in their efforts to locate Herbert.  Franchot had also 
produced at least one witness who claimed to have seen Leo Beemer 
emerge from a car barn with a lantern, head in the direction of the 
trestle, flag down an oncoming car, and then head underneath the 
trestle.74  Cumulatively, that testimony served to isolate Arthur’s 
search for his cousin on the trestle and bridge, suggesting that this 
search may have been foolish, and to confirm conductor Beemer’s 
claim that he had never accompanied Arthur up the trestle with a 
lantern, or indeed had any contact with him after Herbert was thrown 
off.  The image conveyed by those witnesses was that of Arthur 
Wagner going off on an inexplicable wild goose chase in search of his 
cousin, while all the other members of the search party, including 
Beemer, went to the logical place to search.  
Consequently, even if Judge Wheeler had then instructed the 
jury that any negligence on the part of the railway was a “proximate 
cause” not only of risks to Herbert but also of risks to Arthur in his 
capacity of a rescuer, the jury would have had to find that Arthur was 
not contributorily negligent in going up the trestle to the bridge in the 
dark.  The only evidence that Arthur had been invited to go up the 
trestle, and then deprived of light, came from Arthur’s own 
testimony.75  No one had seen Beemer on the bridge, or in the company 
of Arthur at any time.  If Arthur had not been invited to go onto the 
bridge, he had gone there in the darkness, not knowing what conditions 
he might encounter.  As Ward put in his exchange in connection with 
motions, “I haven’t the slightest doubt [that] any intelligent man would 
know it was a dangerous place.”76  In short, it was plain, after the 
testimony of several witnesses, that a jury would need to believe 
Arthur’s account, and disbelieve the accounts of all the other 
witnesses, to find that Arthur had not negligently contributed to his fall 
 
74 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 76. 
75 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 103-04.  
76 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 260.  
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from the bridge.  Franchot had presented much stronger evidence of 
the defendant’s version of the facts of Wagner. 
But there was another way in which Arthur could have 
prevailed that was foreclosed by Wheeler’s instructions to the jury.  
Had the injury to Arthur been proximately caused by the railway’s 
original negligence in permitting Herbert to fall off the car, Arthur 
could have recovered unless he had been contributory negligent.  But 
Wheeler, with some help from Franchot, decided, as a matter of law, 
that any possible negligence on the part of the railway towards Herbert 
had no causal connection to Arthur’s injuries.  Here are the relevant 
passages in the exchanges between Wheeler, Franchot, and Ward when 
the lawyers made motions for jury instructions after both sides had 
rested: 
Mr. Ward: Does your Honor feel that the original 
negligence can not be charged to the defendant in this 
case?  
 
The Court: I am inclined to think so, on the whole case.  
 
Mr. Ward: I am very much interested in that question, 
and I am glad to have it come before your Honor. 
 
The Court: It would be pressing the doctrine to an 
extreme.77 
  
Moments later, Franchot pressed further: 
 
Mr. Franchot: I would like to make a further motion. I 
take it from what your Honor says that your Honor is 
going to withdraw from the jury all of the evidence     
with respect to the first accident: that is, any act of 
omission or commission on the part of the motorman or 
conductor up to the time when Herbert Wagner fell.  
 
The Court: That is my present disposition.  
 
Mr. Franchot: Withdraw that from the jury. 
 
 
77 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 257. 
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The Court: Without saying so finally now, but that is 
my disposition. That is what I think I shall do now . . . 
I will make it in the morning, whatever it is, but I think 
that you gentlemen, as I look at it now, unless I change 
my mind, may be prepared to sum it up along the lines 
I have laid down. 
 
Mr. Franchot: And our summing up will be restricted to 
merely that one point [that is, whether Beemer invited 
Arthur to accompany him up the trestle and 
subsequently withdrew the lantern].  
 
The Court: If I still adhere to it it will be. Let me have 
your briefs again, and I will look over your cases.78 
 
The next morning Wheeler announced the following ruling:  
 
The Court: Mr. Stenographer, you may put upon the 
minutes that . . . the court sends the case to the jury 
upon the question whether the defendant’s conductor 
asked the plaintiff to show him where the accident 
happened and accompanied him up onto the trestle and 
afterwards left him in the dark, whether those facts 
constituted negligence on the part of the defendant or 
not.79 
Franchot then pressed Wheeler about whether that charge 
asked the jury to find whether in fact Beemer had done any of those 
things, in addition to whether, if he did, they constituted negligence.  
Wheeler then confirmed this, stating that he was “withdrawing all 
other questions from the consideration of the jury, saving that of 
damages, of course.”80   Ward then asked for an exception to Wheeler’s 
ruling that he would not submit to the jury “questions of negligence 
arising out of the first accident,” and Wheeler granted it.81  The 
exchanges ended with Franchot confirming that “all consideration of 
what happened before the car stopped” would be withdrawn from the 
 
78 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 269-70.  
79 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 271-72. 
80 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 272. 
81 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 272.  
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jury, and that “we are bound by your Honor’s ruling that no negligence 
can be found on that as a basis for liability in this case.”82 
Wheeler had said, in his instruction to the jury, that his 
instruction was premised on the assumption that after Herbert was 
thrown off, the car had “crossed the trestle and reached a place of 
safety and without injuring the plaintiff in any way,” and that therefore, 
Arthur “must base his right to recover upon what transpired after the 
car in question had crossed the trestle and reached the ground.”83  
Wheeler did not offer any reason for why he attached significance to 
the car’s having reached a “place of safety” without injuring Arthur, 
but it appears he had seen that event as breaking some “chain” of 
causation that began with the successive risks to which the railway’s 
actions, while the car was moving, had exposed Herbert and other 
passengers, and ended when the car stopped.  A new “chain” thus 
began when the railway may have exposed Herbert to risks that caused 
his fall: that was the sole matter for the jury to consider.  
It is interesting that Ward did not make more of an effort to 
convince Wheeler that the risk to Arthur in going up the trestle could 
be causally connected to the original negligence of the railway towards 
Herbert.  As noted, Wheeler had given only cryptic reasons for his 
inclination to treat all of the alleged negligence toward Herbert as 
irrelevant to Arthur’s potential recovery, stating that “[i]t would be 
pressing the doctrine to an extreme.”84   Perhaps Ward had concluded 
that it would have been futile to continue efforts to convince Wheeler 
that his analysis of proximate causation in the case was flawed, so he 
resolved to make exceptions to Wheeler’s charge and preserve them 
for appeal. 
Given the testimony at trial and the way Wheeler framed the 
Wagner case in his charge to the jury, it was almost inconceivable that 
the jury would have found against the International Railway Company 
on this basis, and it did not.  The result was that on April 15, 1918, 
Arthur Wagner was facing the prospect of living with serious and 
permanent physical injuries–in his instruction to the jury Wheeler 
described Arthur as “partially . . . paralyzed in his lower limbs” and 
unable to work as an upholsterer.85  Arthur would not have had any 
medical insurance, and would have required constant medical attention 
 
82 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 272-73.  
83 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 275.  
84 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 257. 
85 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 279.  
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to keep his feet from deteriorating further.  Wheeler stated in his 
instruction that Arthur’s life expectancy at the time of trial was 
approximately 30 years, and that if the jury found that he could 
recover, he would be entitled not only to lost wages and medical 
expenses but to pain and suffering.86 Given the nature and 
consequences of Arthur’s injury, the sum of $50,000 in damages that 
he requested, while a large amount for 1918, does not seem to be a 
particularly inflated amount of compensation. 
Ironically, Herbert Wagner, who had apparently been                        
thrown completely clear of the tracks, bridge, and trestle, landing 
approximately 20 feet on the ground beneath the trestle and then rolling 
onto the Erie tracks, was not seriously injured.  Herbert testified that 
he dislocated his shoulder when he was jostled off the car, but by the 
spring of 1918, when he was deposed, he was healthy enough to have 
been drafted into the U.S. Army, and was planning to join a corps of 
engineers encamped at Ayre, Massachusetts.87  Although Herbert had 
emerged from his accident on August 20, 1916 comparatively 
unscathed, Arthur had certainly not.  He testified that after falling from 
the bridge he had remained in the hospital for about nine months and a 
half, being able to move around on crutches only in the middle of June, 
1917; that at the time of trial he had “no strength” in his legs, could not 
bend his ankles or move his feet, and could not walk without crutches; 
and that he continued to have trouble with his bowels.88  Arthur had 
very little to lose by appealing to the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of New York, and on May 11th of 1919, Hamilton Ward 
filed an appeal, moving for a new trial.  
The appeal was heard by the Appellate Division, a five-
member court at the time, on October 6, 1919.89  A majority of the 
Appellate Division denied Ward’s motion for a new trial, upheld the 
jury verdict against Arthur, and ordered the plaintiff to pay costs in 
both courts, an amount that came to $196.94.90  One judge, John S. 
Lambert, dissented, concluding both the question of Arthur’s 
contributory negligence and that of any possible negligence on the part 
 
86 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 279-80.  
87 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 40. 
88 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 114-16, 118.  
89 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 291-92. The Appellate Division judges who heard 
the appeal were Frederick W. Kruse, the Presiding Justice, and Associate Justices Pascal C.J. 
DeAngelis, Nathaniel Foote, Irving G. Hubbs, and John S. Lambert. 
90 Wagner v. Int’l Ry. Co., 189 A.D. 925, 925 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919), rev’d, 133 N.E. 437 
(1921).  
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of Beemer should have been submitted to the jury.91  The Appellate 
Division’s order was entered on October 20, 1919, and on March 9, 
1920, Ward filed a further appeal from that judgment to the New York 
Court of Appeals.92  
II.  THE GOVERNING CASE LAW 
The trial in Wagner had been concerned with the facts, plus the 
trial court’s (partially stated) conception of the applicable law, as 
reflected in its instructions to the jury.  Before the Court of Appeals, 
however, only the applicable law could be the subject of contention.  
To understand the parties’ strategies on appeal, as well as the 
significance both of what Judge Cardozo did and did not say in his 
opinion in Wagner, it is necessary to understand the state of the New 
York case law on liability to rescuers at the time of the appeal. 
In the decades before Wagner was decided, the courts of New 
York had analyzed cases involving rescue in traditional proximate 
cause terms.  The question was whether the negligence of a defendant 
that endangered one party was, or could be found to be, a proximate 
cause of harm to the endangered party’s rescuer.  The test for 
proximate cause was stated in a standard phrase which identified one 
act or event as a “proximate cause” of another event (such as an injury 
suffered by a rescuer) if the latter followed from the former in a 
“natural and probable” sequence.  
One of the most prominent New York cases articulating the 
“natural and probable sequence” test for proximate causation was 
Laidlaw v. Sage.93  At least part of the reason for Laidlaw’s 
prominence, we think, is that the case, and the facts that generated it, 
were notorious.  On May 26, 1892, an individual named Norcross               
had entered the lower Manhattan offices of Russell Sage, a well-                    
known industrialist, and handed Sage a note.94   The note threatened to 
detonate a bomb Norcross said he had in a carpet bag he was carrying, 
if Sage did not give him $1.2 million.95   Shortly thereafter, Norcross 
 
91 Wagner, 189 A.D. at 925.  
92 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437.  
93 52 N.E. 679 (N.Y. 1899). See the discussion of Laidlaw in WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE 
LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920-1980, 95 (2001). 
94 Laidlaw, 52 N.E. at 680.   
95 Id.  
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did detonate the bomb.96   Laidlaw, another individual in Sage’s offices 
at the time, was injured by the explosion.   Laidlaw sued Sage, alleging 
that just before the explosion, Sage had placed Laidlaw between 
himself and Norcross in order to protect himself.97  The explosion 
received widespread publicity.98  
Laidlaw’s suit against Sage was tried four times, and appealed 
three times.99  In the last appeal, one of the issues was whether, even 
assuming that Sage had done what Laidlaw alleged, Sage’s actions 
were a proximate cause of Laidlaw’s injuries. 
The opinion in Laidlaw, which runs twenty pages in the fine 
print of the Northeastern Reporter of the time, is not completely 
coherent to the modern reader.  At points, the opinion conflates cause 
in fact with proximate cause, and the absence of causation with remote 
cause.100  But Laidlaw’s statement about proximate cause seems to 
have become canonical: “The proximate cause of an event must be 
understood to be that which in a natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by any new cause, produce that event, without which that 
event would not have occurred.”101   Ward’s Brief on Appeal to the 
Court of Appeals quoted this passage from Laidlaw twice;102 
Franchot’s brief cited Laidlaw three times.103 
Laidlaw was not a rescue case: its statement about the nature 
of proximate cause was a predicate, or premise, for particular 
arguments about rescue.  However, a number of New York cases, 
decided both before and after Laidlaw, had addressed rescue.  Each 
had held in favor of the plaintiff-rescuer.  In addition, as would prove 
important for purposes of the appellate arguments in Wagner, each 
involved a rescue taking place virtually immediately after another 
person was placed in danger. 
Each of the New York rescue cases employed the chain of 
causation reasoning that was reflected in Laidlaw’s reference to a 
 
96 Id. at 681.  
97 Id. 
98 See, e.g., A Crazy Man’s Lawful Act, N.Y. TIMES, December 5, 1891. 
99 Laidlaw, 52 N.E. at 682. 
100 Id. at 688 (“A remote cause is one which is inconclusive in reasoning, because from it 
no certain conclusion can be legitimately drawn. From the remote cause the effect does not 
necessarily follow.”) (quoting an uncited anonymous article in the American Law Review). 
101 Id. at 688 (quoting Sher. & R. Neg. § 26). 
102 Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 9, 16. 
103 Brief of Respondent at 11-12, 14, Wagner v. International Railway Co., 133 N.E. 437 
(N.Y. 1921) [hereinafter “Brief of Respondent”]. 
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“sequence, unbroken by any new cause.”104   For example, in Gibney 
v. State,105 a father had attempted to rescue his son from a canal.  The 
defendant argued that its negligence toward the son could not be 
regarded as the cause of the father’s death.  The court rejected this 
argument, on the ground that the “peril to which the father exposed 
himself was the natural consequence of the situation” and that there 
was therefore no “break in the chain of causes.”106  
Similarly, in Donnelly v. Piercy Contracting Co.,107 the 
deceased was killed while trying to rescue a horse endangered by the 
defendant’s negligence.  Judge Andrews, previewing the approach he 
would employ in his Palsgraf dissent ten years later,108 and citing to 
Laidlaw, said that the question was whether “the act of the defendant 
gave rise to the stream of events which culminated in the accident,” 
asked whether there was “an unbroken connection between the 
wrongful act and injury,” and answered that there was “no such break 
as a matter of law in the causal connection in the case before us.”109  
A handful of other New York cases took essentially the same 
position.110  Cases in other states had predominately reached the same 
conclusion.  Thus, although there was not a long line of New York 
cases holding that negligence toward one party could generate liability 
to that party’s rescuer when the rescuer acted instinctively and quickly, 
there was no contrary New York authority, and other states had taken 
the same position.  There was not quite a firm “rescue doctrine,” but it 
was certainly established that there could be liability in negligence to 
rescuers. 
It is important to note that this body of cases addressed the 
plaintiff’s prima facie liability in rescue situations. There was a 
separate question, addressed in a different line of authority, whether, 
even if a defendant had prima facie liability to a rescuer, the defendant 
could avoid liability under the defense of contributory negligence.  
This line of cases stretched back at least to the 1871 case of Eckert v. 
 
104 Laidlaw, 52 N.E. at 688.  
105 33 N.E. 142 (N.Y. 1893).  
106 Id.   
107 118 N.E. 605 (N.Y. 1918). 
108 See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews J., 
dissenting). 
109 Donnelly, 118 N.E. at 606.  
110 See, e.g., O’Brien v. Erie R. Co., 139 A.D. 291, 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910); Waters v. 
Taylor, 112 N.E. 727, 728 (N.Y. 1916) (dealing with the issue under workman’s 
compensation). 
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Long Island R.R. Co.,111 well-known and frequently cited at the time 
of Wagner and today.  Eckert held that the question of whether a 
rescuer was contributorily negligent was typically for the jury, and that 
errors in judgment made under conditions of emergency did not bar 
recovery.112  Eckert also involved a rescue that occurred virtually 
immediately after the person being rescued had been placed in 
danger.113 
III.  THE ARGUMENTS MADE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
At the Court of Appeals, Ward made the issue of proximate 
causation the centerpiece of his argument.114  By that point, Ward had 
assembled a number of cases, including the New York cases we 
discussed above, in which rescuers had recovered from defendants 
who had placed others in danger.  Of the 33 pages in his brief, Ward 
devoted approximately 15 of them to such cases, using them in support 
of his eventual conclusion that “it was certainly not for the court to say 
as a matter of law that Arthur Wagner[‘s] . . . attempt [to rescue 
Herbert] did not result from the negligent act of the defendant in 
injuring Herbert Wagner and placing him in peril.”115 
One of the main challenges for Ward was that, unlike past 
cases, Arthur Wagner’s attempted rescue was not literally instinctive 
and immediate.  Arthur did not see Herbert fall and immediately act to 
help him.  Instead, he first had to wait for the trolley to move several 
hundred feet and stop.116  Then, under his account, he talked with the 
conductor and made his way back toward the point where he thought 
he might find Herbert.  None of the rescue cases on which Ward relied 
involved a delayed rescue of this sort, although none expressly limited 
liability to situations involving immediate and instinctive rescues only. 
Consequently, Ward did not have a precedent that settled the 
question whether this kind of immediacy mattered, or instead was a 
distinction without a difference.  That is why he first argued, based on 
Laidlaw, Donnelly, and other rescue cases, that the rescue had taken 
 
111 43 N.Y. 502 (1871). 
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 5. Both parties filed essentially identical briefs at 
both appellate levels.  
115 Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 21-22. 
116 Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 4-5.  
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place in unbroken sequence.117  Then, relying on the literal language 
of Laidlaw, he deemphasized the lack of immediacy of the rescue and 
argued that, under the circumstances, Arthur’s attempted rescue of 
Herbert was “instinctive, natural, and necessary.”118  
Ward focused on the nature of Arthur’s motivation rather than 
the length of time he had to decide what to do.  He noted that the cases 
that had allowed rescuers to recover had drawn no distinction between 
“instinctive” and “deliberate” rescue attempts: the sole criterion had 
been whether, when an effort to “preserve human life” was being 
attempted, the attempt had been made “under such circumstances as to 
constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons.”119  Ward 
argued that it had been error for Wheeler to refuse to instruct the jury 
to that effect, and that it had been error to instruct the jury that there 
could be no recovery if Arthur had gone onto the trestle and bridge 
without an invitation from the defendant.120    
Franchot, in contrast, made exactly the arguments that Ward 
anticipated.  He contended that actions by rescuers that were not 
“instinctive” amounted to deliberate, voluntary assumption of the risk 
in rescuing, and that injured rescuers who deliberated before 
undertaking rescue efforts should therefore be barred from recovery.  
He pointed out that Arthur had walked over 600 feet up the trestle to 
the bridge, and “[d]uring every step of the way and every instant of the 
time he had a chance to think.”121 
 Franchot’s brief recognized that the proximate causation 
argument was Ward’s strongest, and developed a two-prong strategy 
to refute it.  First, he argued that in every proximate cause case cited 
by Ward in his brief, there were two elements lacking in Wagner: “an 
actual impending peril to the life or limb of either the plaintiff himself 
or some other person or persons,” and evidence that “[t]he plaintiff, 
seeing the actual peril, acted instinctively and impulsively, or at least 
in a reasonable manner under the circumstances.”122  In Wagner, 
 
117 Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 9-10. 
118 Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 22.  
119 Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 21-22, 28-29.  
120 Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 24, 28, 30, 32. Ward also argued that the court 
should have allowed him to recall Arthur to establish that he believed Herbert was somewhere 
on the trestle, and that there was no evidence that Arthur was intoxicated at any time on August 
20, 1916, as Franchot had suggested. Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 30, 32. Neither of 
those arguments played any part in the Court of Appeals’ decision in Wagner.  
121 Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 25, 32. 
122 Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 25. 
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Franchot maintained, “the peril to Herbert Wagner was over . . . . 
There was nothing except [Arthur’s] conjecture or belief that could 
have lead him up onto the trestle, a belief which nobody else present 
entertained and which we contend it was entirely unreasonable and 
improper for him to entertain.”123 
The second prong of Franchot’s proximate cause argument was 
that Ward had confused proximate causation with contributory 
negligence.  In most of the “proximate cause” cases Ward had cited, 
“the negligence of the defendant[‘s] [having] proximately caused the 
accident was assumed . . . without consideration or discussion,”124 and 
the issue was the contributory negligence of the plaintiff.  In his 
summary of the cases, Franchot claimed that  
[I]t will be seen that the various cases cited by the 
plaintiff . . . may be authority for relaxing the rule as to 
contributory negligence in deference to the noble 
instinct or impulse of human nature to render assistance 
to others in peril, or in deference to the instinct of self-
preservation which leads a plaintiff to act sometimes 
foolishly or recklessly under the stress of an immediate 
emergency, but they have no authority on the question 
of proximate cause which is now under consideration: 
in each and every one of them, the relation of cause and 
effect between the negligent act of the defendant and 
the injury to the plaintiff was clear, natural, and 
necessary under all the rules, and in fact the question of 
proximate cause was hardly discussed. The decisions 
can be supported upon the doctrine that impulsive, 
instinctive, and, therefore, automatic human action 
does not break the chain of cause and effect. . . . As 
previously pointed out, the action of the plaintiff in this 
case . . . was deliberative; he had time for reflection and 
did reflect; during every instant of time while was 
walking back from the car throughout the distance of 
600 feet to the place where he fell, he had chance for 
thought.125 
 
123 Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 27. 
124 Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 29.  
125 Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 31-32.  
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This may have been true of some of the cases, but not the 
important ones. For example, two of the central New York cases, 
Gibney126 and Donnelly,127 expressly singled out proximate cause for 
separate treatment.  
Franchot further argued that under New York law, whether the 
proximate cause requirement was satisfied was always a question of 
law.128  This also was not the case, although there was some language 
in the case law supporting the proposition.  Then, based on this 
(dubious) proposition, Franchot contended that any negligence of the 
defendant toward Herbert Wagner was not a proximate cause of the 
injuries to Arthur Wagner, as a matter of law.129  Franchot based this 
last argument on two propositions he gleaned from Laidlaw: (1) there 
was not an unbroken sequence between any negligence on the part of 
the trolley car line toward Herbert and Arthur’s injury; and (2) because 
no one but Arthur thought that Herbert’s body could be found on the 
tracks rather than below, Arthur’s attempt at rescue was neither 
“necessary” nor “natural.”130 
 Point (2) was a clever and artful, though ultimately 
unsuccessful, effort to avoid the Eckert line of cases.  Franchot was 
attempting to turn what the Court of Appeals might well decide should 
be a question of fact -- whether Arthur had been contributorily 
negligent in the manner in which he undertook the rescue -- into a 
question of proximate cause, and then to have that question decided as 
a matter of law in the defendant’s favor, thus preventing any remand 
for a new trial. 
After the briefs in Wagner were submitted, it was clear that 
there were two central issues remaining in the case.  One was whether 
Wheeler’s ruling that none of the original acts of negligence of the 
railway could be made a basis for recovery by Arthur Wagner was 
correct. The other was whether, even if Beemer’s alleged conduct 
toward Arthur had amounted to negligence which caused Arthur’s fall 
and injury, Arthur could not recover, because his supposedly bizarre 
search for Herbert on the tracks either negated proximate cause as a 
 
126 33 N.E. at 142 (“It is contended by the attorney general that the negligence of the state 
. . . cannot be regarded as the cause of the death of the father. . . . But . . . the peril to which 
the father exposed himself was the natural consequence of the situation.”).  
127 118 N.E. at 606 (“Nor do we think that the intervention of the deceased prevents the 
original act of negligence being the proximate cause of the accident.”). 
128 Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 11. 
129 Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 11.   
130 Brief of Respondent, supra note 103, at 14. 
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matter of law, or was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.  Both 
issues turned on the treatment of injured rescuers at common law. 
This was the posture in which Wagner v. International Railway 
Co. was submitted to the Court of Appeals for decision. 
IV.  THE OPINION IN WAGNER 
Cardozo handed down the opinion in Wagner in 1921, when he 
was in the seventh of his eighteen years (1914-32) on the New York 
Court of Appeals.  He had already written a book on judging – his 
celebrated The Nature of the Judicial Process.131  He had also written 
a number of significant tort decisions: MacPherson v. Buick132 five 
years earlier, Adams v. Bullock133 two years earlier, and Hynes v. New 
York Central R.R. Co.134 earlier that same year.  He was, in short, a 
seasoned and self-conscious appellate judge who was not new to 
deciding tort cases.  But he was a judge, not an academic,135 and torts 
cases were just one set of cases that appeared on the quite diverse 
docket of the Court of Appeals.  Cardozo’s opinion in Wagner should 
be understood in this context.  He was deciding the case, responding 
to the arguments the parties had made to the Court, and explaining the 
basis of his decision, as he sought to do in all his opinions.  But one of 
Cardozo’s instincts, as a judge, was to establish doctrinal propositions 
that he hoped could give guidance across a range of cases.  Wagner 
would give him an opportunity to lay down such a proposition for cases 
involving tort actions by rescuers. 
A. Cardozo’s Approach 
In his opinion, Cardozo first recited the facts in the passage that 
we quoted at the outset of Part I.  He then identified the assignment of 
error on appeal.  This was the passage in the trial court’s jury 
instruction containing the “limitation” on the defendant’s liability to 
 
131 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). Wagner was 
decided on November 22, 1921. Consequently, the book certainly had already been written 
and put to bed, and the odds are that it had already been published.  
132 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
133 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919). 
134 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921) (decided May 31). 
135 See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 133 (1990) (discussing the 
reasons judicial opinions are not often regarded by academics as reflecting high-quality 
scholarship). 
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Arthur “unless” two conditions were satisfied: that Arthur had been 
invited to attempt to rescue Herbert, and that the conductor (Beemer) 
had accompanied him.  As Cardozo put it, “Whether the limitation may 
be upheld, is the question to be answered.”136 
This way of posing the issue was accurate, but it also contained 
the implied (and accurate) suggestion that there was, in general, 
liability to rescuers, and that something unusual might have occurred 
in the case.  Otherwise, the term “limitation” would not have been 
completely accurate.  If, as a general matter, there was no liability to 
rescuers in cases where there was sufficient time for an invitation to 
rescue to be issued, and for a prospective rescuer to deliberate on his 
own about whether to attempt a rescue, a time interval’s being 
“immediate,” or a rescuer’s reaction being “instinctive,” would have 
been more accurately termed a “prerequisite” or “precondition” to 
liability, rather than a “limitation” on liability.  From the outset, then, 
Cardozo implied that the trial court may have been swimming against 
the current by doing something unusual or special in imposing a 
“limitation” on liability that commonly extended to rescuers. 
The next sentence is the most famous in the opinion: “Danger 
invites rescue.”137  In many of his opinions, Cardozo moved abruptly 
and without preliminaries from his statement of the facts to the legal 
conclusion that resolved a case.   Explanation of the basis for the legal 
conclusion stated at the outset then followed.  For example, in 
Palsgraf, the first sentence after his statement of the facts was “The 
conduct of the defendant’s guard, if a wrong in relation to the holder 
of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing 
far away.”138  And in Adams v. Bullock, the first sentence after the 
statement of facts was “We think the verdict cannot stand.”139 
But that is not what happened in Wagner. “Danger invites 
rescue” may count as a legal conclusion today, but it was not yet a legal 
conclusion when Cardozo wrote the phrase.  Rather, Cardozo moved 
abruptly and without preliminaries from a statement of the facts to 
what, at that point, was an explanation.  The next sentence confirms 
this, for it was no more “legal” than the first: “The cry of distress is a 
summons to relief.”140  Rather, these two sentences were “taken over 
 
136 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437.  
137 Id.  
138 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 341.  
139 Adams, 125 N.E. at 93.  
140 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437. 
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from the facts of life,” as Cardozo would say in a later tort case, writing 
for the U.S. Supreme Court.141   He thus began, not with a rule or a 
legal conclusion, but with facts of which he seemed almost to take 
judicial notice.  The major premise of his Wagner opinion came from 
a sense of the way the world actually works rather than a doctrinal 
proposition of tort law.  
Reading those two sentences, Edward Franchot would already 
have known that he had lost.  Even before expressly addressing 
Franchot’s proximate cause argument, Cardozo had dispensed with it.  
But just to be clear, he then gave that argument the back of his hand, 
moving from the facts of everyday life to the law:  
The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in 
tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them 
as normal. It places their effects within the range of the 
natural and the probable. The wrong that imperils life is 
a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his 
rescuer.142   
There then followed, in the same paragraph, descriptions of and 
citations to prior cases so holding, Gibney most prominently.  
Notably, Cardozo never cited Laidlaw in Wagner.  When he 
chose to speak in doctrinal, rather than factual terms, he only gestured 
obliquely in Laidlaw’s direction, using the phrase “natural and 
probable,” but emphasizing the nature of the defendant’s wrong rather 
than a causal connection: a “wrong to the imperiled victim . . . is a 
wrong also to his rescuer.”143  
Cardozo’s omission of any citation to Laidlaw had to have been 
a considered decision on his part.  The explosion that gave rise to 
Laidlaw took place in New York City when Cardozo was 22 years old, 
and received widespread publicity: Sage’s prominence alone would 
have ensured that it came to Cardozo’s attention.  The multiple trials 
of the resulting suit against Russell Sage occurred while Cardozo was 
a young lawyer in New York.  In their briefs, both Ward and Franchot 
had cited Laidlaw multiple times. 
In our view, the reason Cardozo did not cite Laidlaw is that he 
wanted to avoid as much as possible the “chain of causation” 
conception of proximate cause that Franchot had presented to the 
 
141 Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934). 
142 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437. 
143 Id. 
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court, that Ward had tried to sidestep, and that Laidlaw reflected.  To 
do this, he talked mainly about the rescue cases, and when it was 
necessary to speak of what amounted to proximate cause, he 
nonetheless did not use that term and did not talk about “chains” of 
causation.  
Rather, as Warren Seavey suggested long ago, Cardozo 
focused in Wagner on the nature of risk.144  The risk in question was 
the risk to potential rescuers of persons endangered by a party’s 
negligence.  This concern with risk was also evident in MacPherson, 
in which the risk he identified was to users of a product from negligent 
manufacture of the product.  In Palsgraf, Cardozo also spoke in the 
language of risk. In that case, the concern was with the absence of any 
apparent risk to a party who is not foreseeably endangered by an act 
that is negligent to someone else.  
It would be possible to describe Cardozo’s focus on risk in 
Wagner as another way of discussing the duty of a negligent party to 
rescuers of those whom the party has endangered.  But it would be 
anachronistic to do this: to see Cardozo as concerned, one way or the 
other, with the nature or independent status of duty as an element of 
the cause of action in Wagner would be to read something into the case 
that is not there.145  Cardozo’s opinion does not reflect any 
preoccupation with, or even interest in, the duty concept.  As an 
abstract proposition, Cardozo’s identification and characterization of 
the relevant risk in Wagner might be thought consistent with 
recognizing duty as an independent element of a cause of action in tort, 
but it would take a big leap to read such recognition into the Wagner 
opinion itself.  That today “rescue” cases are analyzed by some 
commentators in terms of duty, breach, and causation, does not mean 
that Cardozo did so.  
 
144 Warren Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 48 YALE L.J. 390, 398-99 
(1939). John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have contended that the concept of duty was 
central to Cardozo’s earlier opinion in MacPherson. Whatever may have been the case in 
MacPherson, the concept of duty is not present in his Wagner opinion. See John C. P. Goldberg 
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1823 nn.355-
56 (1998). 
145 Beginning with his 1941 treatise on tort law, Prosser contended that duty was essentially 
a conclusory and unnecessary category. WILLIAM  L. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS 180 (1941).  
Goldberg and Zipursky have famously taken issue with him on this score, and less famously 
with each of us.  The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 144,  at  1745-46 n.45 (White), 1770 
(Abraham). But Prosser only began taking issue with the duty concept two and half decades 
after MacPherson, and more than a decade after Palsgraf.  Goldberg and Zipursky’s attack on 
Prosser came more than five decades after that.  
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For Cardozo, however, the risk at issue was definitely 
relational.146  The whole point of the phrase “Danger invites rescue” 
was that risking harm to a potential victim also risked harming a 
potential rescuer.  Approaching risk in this way contrasted with the 
“chain of causation” conception in Laidlaw, and with Franchot’s use 
of that conception in arguing the defendant’s case.  And as we will 
suggest below, this approach also foreshadowed Cardozo’s much more 
extensive analysis of risk in Palsgraf.  
After stating and supporting the major premise of the opinion, 
that danger invites rescue, Cardozo turned directly to Franchot’s 
arguments.  As to the asserted requirement that a rescue be instinctive, 
he was willing to assume that the peril to the first victim and rescue 
“must in substance be one transaction . . . that there must be unbroken 
continuity between the commission of the wrong and the effort to             
avert its consequences.”147  But instinctiveness was not required. 
“Continuity in such circumstances is not broken by the exercise of 
volition.”148  Rather, it was “enough that the act, whether impulsive or 
deliberate, is the child of the occasion.”149  These sentences were the 
full extent of Cardozo’s engagement with Franchot’s lengthy attempts 
at trial to establish the factual predicate for his proximate cause 
position and with his extensive arguments on appeal regarding that 
position, phrased in terms of what was not “natural” or “necessary.”  
In fact, Franchot’s argument that it was preposterous for Arthur 
to search for Herbert on the tracks rather than below -- and that, as a 
consequence, the causal link between the defendant’s negligence in 
causing Herbert’s fall and Arthur’s injury had been broken -- 
apparently did not merit a direct response.  Cardozo refused even to 
engage with this argument in the language of proximate cause.  For 
Cardozo, the substance of this contention went to Arthur’s possible 
contributory negligence, not to the defendant’s negligence or 
proximate cause.  
On that issue, Franchot had argued that Arthur was 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law in undertaking a rescue of 
his cousin on the trestle and bridge tracks rather than below the trestle.  
Cardozo also dismissed that argument: “We think the quality of 
 
146 See The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 144, at 1744 (arguing that duty is a relational 
concept). 
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[Arthur’s] acts in the situation that confronted him was to be 
determined by the jury.”150  Arthur had a basis for thinking that 
Herbert’s body might not actually have fallen to the ground below, and 
the decision he made was in the circumstance of an emergency: “The 
plaintiff had to choose at once, in agitation and with imperfect 
knowledge.”151 
In conclusion, therefore, the lower courts were reversed: 
“Whether Herbert Wagner’s fall was due to the defendant’s 
negligence, and whether plaintiff, in going to the rescue, as he did, was 
foolhardy or reasonable in light of the emergency confronting him, 
were questions for the jury.”152  What was not a question for the jury, 
however, was whether the defendant’s negligence as to Herbert was 
also negligence as to his rescuer, Arthur.  It was, as a matter of law. 
Was Wagner a case whose peculiar facts revealed that a new 
approach to questions of proximate causation was required, one that 
side-stepped inquiries into “chains” of causation and their breakage, or 
“superceding” causes, for inquiries about the creation of risks through 
negligence and their scope?  Or was it a case that sought to carve out 
an enduring exception, for human rescuers of other humans in peril, to 
the principle that unreasonable exposure to risks, whether voluntary or 
not, barred injured persons from recovering against those who had 
negligently created the risks?  
Actually, it was both: a case in which Cardozo signaled that 
where rescuer plaintiffs were concerned, traditional limitations on 
recovery in tort law based on proximate causation or on contributory 
negligence were, in many cases, going to be ignored.  After Wagner, 
“danger invites rescue” was not only a fact of everyday life, the 
premise of Cardozo’s approach, but also a legal principle.   
B. Foreshadowing Palsgraf 
We think that the decision in Wagner contains virtually 
everything necessary to its more celebrated offspring, Palsgraf.  The 
latter case is rightly considered to be Cardozo’s foremost statement on 
the nature and reach of liability for negligence.  But seven years before 
Palsgraf, Wagner had already done essentially everything that 




152 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 438. 
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First, Wagner explained, albeit in more summary fashion, the 
centrality of risk-analysis to questions involving what others had 
analyzed in terms of proximate cause.  The risk to a victim was also a 
risk to his or her rescuer.  Cardozo might instead have said, “risking 
harm to a victim is a proximate cause of harm to his or her rescuer, as 
a matter of law.”  And he might have said, “a party with a duty to 
exercise reasonable care toward someone also has a duty to his 
rescuer.”  But Cardozo did not say either of these things.  He spoke in 
terms of risk and wrong.  He spoke about the nature of the defendant’s 
negligence.  That is precisely what he would later do in Palsgraf.               
As he memorably said there, “The risk reasonably to be perceived 
defines the duty to be obeyed. . . .”153  Rescue is a risk “reasonably to 
be perceived” when a potential victim is endangered: “Danger invites 
rescue.”  Danger to Mrs. Palsgraf, in contrast, was not reasonably to 
be perceived. 
Second, Wagner rejected the causal-chain analysis that Judge 
Andrews would later employ in his Palsgraf dissent.  The defendant in 
Wagner argued, among other things, that Arthur Wagner’s considered 
decision to search for Herbert on the tracks, rather than below, broke 
the chain of causation between the negligence of the defendant in 
causing Herbert to fall and Arthur’s own rescue-related injury.  
Cardozo would have none of this.  “Danger invites rescue” was really 
the only proposition he needed, though he did assume for purposes of 
argument that there might not be liability when there was not 
“unbroken” continuity between the first wrong and a rescue.154 
 Finally, Wagner applied the distinction between a question of 
law and a question of fact in this area.  “Danger invites rescue” is a 
rule of law at a high level of generality.  In stating this rule, Wagner 
constitutes more than a mere holding about what questions were and 
were not for the jury under the facts of that case.  Much like the thin-
skull rule, Wagner articulated a rule that a particular risk -- being 
injured in a rescue of a party negligently endangered -- is automatically 
associated with negligence.  Similarly, Palsgraf articulates a rule about 
a particular risk -- conversely, a particular risk that is automatically not 
associated with negligence -- the risk of injuring an unforeseeable 
party in the course of endangering a foreseeable party.  But this 
approach to classifying, as a matter of law, risks that are or are not 
 
153 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 344. 
154 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 438. 
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associated with negligence did not originate in Palsgraf; it had already 
been adopted in Wagner.  In short, in a very real sense it is Wagner, 
not Palsgraf, that is Cardozo’s seminal decision in this area of tort law. 
C. Wagner’s Subsequent History 
Wagner quickly became a staple principal case in the torts 
casebooks.155  The first RESTATEMENT OF TORTS recognized its 
holding, though limiting it to “normal” efforts to rescue.156  The                 
case remains a standard in contemporary casebooks.157  The third 
Restatement devotes a separate section to “rescue,” eliminating the 
“normal efforts” qualification of its predecessors.158  However, most 
treatments of rescue, then and now, continue to deal with the subject 
under the rubric of causation, typically providing or explaining why a 
rescue ordinarily is not a superseding cause that precludes imposition 
of liability on the party that negligently endangered the victim being 
rescued.159  The chain-of-causation approach apparently cannot be 
banished from thinking about liability to rescuers, although the effect 
of Wagner on that approach is to reject outright the argument that a 
decision to rescue a negligently endangered person can break some 
chain of causation.  The chain-of-causation reasoning that Cardozo 
sought to avoid in Wagner keeps rearing its arguably-ugly head.                                      
CONCLUSION 
   Wagner v. International Railway has disappeared from 
prominent coverage in contemporary torts casebooks, although 
Palsgraf remains highlighted.  We believe that Wagner should be 
given prominent treatment, and paired with Palsgraf.  A comparison 
of the two cases could illustrate several doctrinal and jurisprudential 
propositions that might give current students some entry points into the 
 
155 See, e.g., FRANCIS H. BOHLEN, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 266 (2d ed. 1925); LEON 
GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORTS CASES 840 (1931); WILLIAM M. HEPBURN & 
ARCHIBALD H. THROCKMORTON, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 586 (2d ed. 1935); HARRY 
SHULMAN & FLEMING JAMES, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 326 (1942); 
and EDWARD S. THURSTON & WARREN A. SEAVEY, CASES ON TORTS 363 (1942). 
156 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 445 (Am. Law Inst. 1934). By this it apparently meant, not 
extraordinary. See id. at § 443. 
157 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TORTS 417 (11th ed. 2016). 
158 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, at § 32. 
159 See sources cited supra notes 155 and 157. 
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typically bedeviling issue of proximate causation and its relationship 
to duty, negligence, and contributory negligence. 
First, the facts of Wagner, when compared with those of 
Palsgraf, readily demonstrate the arbitrariness of analyses of 
“proximate” causation that emphasize broken or unbroken “chains” of 
causation, or “superceding” or “intervening” causes.  In both Wagner 
and Palsgraf, there was no doubt that the negligence of the 
defendant—the series of careless actions on the part of employees of 
the trolley car line that resulted in Herbert Wagner’s falling from the 
car, or the conduct of the Long Island Railroad’s guard in dislodging a 
package when he helped passengers board a moving train—was a 
factual cause of the injuries to Arthur Wagner and Helen Palsgraf.  
Herbert fell off the car because of the negligence of Beemer and 
possibly Roy, and Arthur attempted to rescue Herbert because Herbert 
was obviously in peril after falling off.  Helen Palsgraf was injured 
because the dislodged package, which contained fireworks, exploded 
when it hit the ground, and the subsequent explosion caused a heavy 
scale on an adjacent railroad platform to topple, coming into contact 
with Palsgraf, who was standing near the scale with her daughters 
while preparing to board another train.  
A “chain” of factual causation between a defendant’s 
negligence and a plaintiff’s injury was thus intact in both cases.  “But 
for” the negligence of Beemer and possibly Roy in Wagner, and the 
guard in Palsgraf, the plaintiffs in those cases would not have been 
injured.  To claim otherwise—to assert that the negligent acts of the 
trolley car employees had somehow “come to rest” when Roy brought 
the car to a stop at the foot of the trestle, or that the explosion of the 
fireworks or the toppling of the scale had somehow “intervened” to 
eliminate any possible liability on the part of the guard toward 
Palsgraf, was simply to attach a label to a normative judgment. 
Whether a cause was “superceding,” or whether an action “broke a 
chain” of causation, in those circumstances, depended only on a court’s 
identifying it as such.  
Cardozo implicitly recognized the arbitrariness of analyses that 
emphasized “chains” of causation, or “superceding” causes, in both 
Wagner and Palsgraf.  He eschewed both analyses by stressing that 
where the negligence of a defendant toward a foreseeable victim ended 
up injuring another victim, the proper technique for determining 
whether liability should extend to the other victim was not to posit a 
prospective chain of causation from the defendant to the injured party 
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and then ask whether it had been “broken” or “superceded” by some 
other act.  The proper technique was to ask whether the defendant’s 
negligent conduct could fairly be described as posing a risk to the party 
who ended up being injured.  In Wagner, Cardozo answered “yes” to 
that question by announcing that “danger invites rescue,” and thus 
prospective rescuers of persons endangered by the conduct of 
negligent defendants were within the category of victims exposed to 
risks by that conduct.  In Palsgraf, he answered “no” to the same 
question, stating that Palsgraf, standing far from the site where a guard 
had caused a package with no notice that it contained fireworks to fall 
to the ground, could not fairly be said to be within the class of persons 
put at risk by the dislodging of the package.  
In Palsgraf, Cardozo put his “risk” analysis in terms of duty 
and foreseeability: “[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived” defined the 
duty of the guard.  It was “risk to another or to others within the range 
of apprehension,” and Helen Palsgraf, “standing far away” from the 
site where the guard dislodged the package, was outside that range.  In 
Wagner, his risk analysis was more categorical: he simply stated that 
as a matter of law, prospective rescuers of persons endangered by 
negligent defendants were also placed at risk by that conduct.  Had 
Cardozo employed his Palsgraf language in Wagner, he would have 
said that the risk of harm to a rescuer was “reasonably to be perceived” 
by a party whose negligence placed someone in peril, and thus the 
negligent party owed a duty not to expose the rescuer to injury.  
Cardozo also said in Palsgraf  that “the law of causation, 
remote or proximate” was “foreign to the case.”  He did not say that in 
Wagner, but neither did he use the language of proximate causation to 
capture the relationship between the negligent trolley car line and the 
rescuer, Arthur Wagner.  Nor did he say, explicitly, that the 
International Railway company owed a duty of care toward rescuers of 
persons endangered by the negligent conduct of its employees.  Nor, 
for that matter, did he used the language of foreseeability in defining 
the relationship between the negligent trolley line and Arthur.  But it 
was plain that his “danger invites rescue” proposition meant that 
negligence which created a risk to a passenger on a trolley car line also 
created a risk to that passenger’s rescuer.  It was also plain, after 
Palsgraf, that the reason that Arthur Wagner might have expected to 
recover for his injuries after the Court of Appeals decision, but Helen 
Palsgraf could not, was that a risk to Arthur stemming from the 
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defendant’s negligent conduct was “reasonably to be perceived,” but 
that a risk to Helen Palsgraf was not.  
We thus think that Wagner and Palsgraf  have more in common 
than commentators may have suspected, and that taken together they 
offer a way of making sense of a good many “proximate cause” cases.  
The defining feature of such cases, and the principal reason they can 
be confounding, is that they combine a factual connection between a 
defendant’s conduct and injury to a plaintiff with the unexpectedness 
of that injury, either in its type, its extent, its manner, or in the class of 
injured victim.  Risks that might reasonably be thought to arise from 
the defendant’s conduct do not result in the injuries being complained 
of; instead other risks eventuate in those injuries.  In Wagner, risks 
resulting from failing to close a door on a trolley, failing to move 
passengers away from an exposed platform on that trolley, and the 
operation of the trolley at excess speed around a curve might 
reasonably have resulted in a passenger on that platform being thrown 
off, and that risk occurred.  But it was not Herbert Wagner who ended 
up being seriously injured; it was his cousin, Arthur, in the role of 
Herbert’s rescuer. And in Palsgraf, it was not an injury to the package 
or its contents that produced a negligence suit against the Long Island 
Railroad, but physical and emotional injuries to Helen Palsgraf from 
coming into contact with the scale.  
Both cases thus produced injuries that were factually connected 
to the negligent conduct of the defendant, but were suffered by 
unexpected classes of persons: rescuers and bystanders.  Both were 
classic “proximate cause” cases, but deciding the cases by declaring 
one injury to be a “proximate” and the other a “remote” cause of the 
defendant’s negligence was as arbitrary as declaring a “chain” of 
causation to remain intact in one case and to have been broken in 
another.  In fact, the cases were both about small risks that were 
factually connected to the large risk that made the defendant negligent.  
Cardozo decreed in Wagner that the small risk of injury to a rescuer 
was sufficiently connected to the large risk of injury to a passenger to 
send the question of the trolley line’s negligence to the jury.  He 
decreed in Palsgraf that the small risk of injury to Palsgraf from 
coming into contact with toppling scales was insufficiently connected 
to the large risk of injury to the package or its contents to permit 
recovery.  He claimed that Palsgraf was not a proximate cause case, 
and he did not use the language of proximate causation in Wagner.  But 
both cases were proximate cause cases, and both were about the 
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connection between the large risks that make conduct negligent and 
the seemingly smaller risk that ends up producing associated injury.  
When paired with Palsgraf, Wagner furnishes a vivid illustration of 
two cases in which Cardozo employed risk analysis to distinguish one 
category of proximate cause cases from another.  For all its prescience, 
Cardozo’s opinion in Wagner concealed that fact as much as it revealed 
it. 
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